Regulators and industry participants have expressed concern that excessive speculation harms agricultural futures markets. Such harm may arise if speculators cause prices to systematically differ from the price sequence that would arise in markets populated by equally informed traders with rational expectations (RE). We show theoretically that, when traders exhibit differences of opinion (DO) about the expected value of the commodity, futures prices may diverge from the RE equilibrium. Moreover, we develop a testable prediction, namely that positions held by different trader groups are correlated with prices in a DO equilibrium but not correlated in a RE equilibrium. We find strong empirical support for the DO-type environment; changes in positions held by managed money traders are positively correlated with prices and changes in positions held by producers are negatively correlated. In the context of our DO model, this finding implies that prices change by more on average than producers think they should and by less than managed money thinks they should. However, the evidence suggests that neither group is systematically more prescient than the other.
In popular descriptions of futures markets, traders are classified by reference to occupation, trading strategy, or business entity -the farmer/producer, refinery/processor, day trader, hedge fund, or index fund. These generalizations also underlie many of the classic models that economists use to describe futures and other financial markets. In such models, heterogeneous groups such as hedgers and speculators (Keynes 1930) , rational and noise traders (DeLong et al. 1990 ), or informed traders and liquidity providers (Easley and O'Hara 1987) interact in the market to generate equilibrium price dynamics. Groups are often symbiotic in these models, but there are also environments in which some groups of traders may exacerbate price dynamics (e.g., Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong 2008) .
Regulators have repeatedly voiced concerns during periods of unusual price dynamics about whether particular traders, namely speculators, cause such volatility and potentially harm futures markets. Specifically, regulators question whether speculators' trades affect fundamental prices and thereby interfere with effective risk management and price discovery. As former Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Chairman Gensler recently stated 1 , "…CFTC data published in 2011 shows the vast majority of trading volume in key futures markets -more than 80 percent in many contracts -is day trading or trading in calendar spreads. Only a modest proportion of average daily trading volume results in reportable traders changing their net long or net short futures positions for the day. This means that about 20 percent or less of the trading is done by traders who bring a longer-term perspective to the market on the price of the commodity." CFTC Commissioner Chilton expressed the same sentiment 2 , "Speculators are necessary liquidity providers to our markets, and while they perhaps are not driving prices to uneconomic levels, they certainly have an effect on prices-above and beyond where they might otherwise go-and American consumers and taxpayers are shouldering that burden."
Regulators express concern about "excessive speculation", a term found in legislation since at least the Grain Futures Act of 1922. It also appears in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Although its use in regulation is unclear, most economists would define excessive speculation as trading that causes prices to differ from "fundamentals", where fundamentals are the price sequence that would result from competitive markets populated by equally informed traders with rational expectations. We adopt this definition to motivate our analysis.
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Our purpose in this article is to examine whether differences of opinion among traders may cause prices to deviate from a rational expectations (RE) equilibrium. In our difference-ofopinion (DO) model, traders do not believe that prices fully incorporate the available information about fundamentals. Rather, they trust their own information signals when choosing positions.
Thus, the DO model may lead to unusual price dynamics, which may appear in the regulator's eye to be cases of excessive speculation.
We extend the difference of opinion literature by considering the different implications of a DO and an RE model for the positions held by particular trader groups. In contrast, previous applications focus on how the DO environment affects price dynamics and trading volume (e.g., Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer 2009; Banerjee and Kremer 2010; Banerjee 2011) . Specifically, we examine how positions taken by trader groups thought to be speculators (or hedgers) relate to market prices in a DO model, and we do the same for a RE model. In effect, we try to unravel whether a DO model explains why speculators are often criticized during periods of unusual price dynamics.
In our DO model, traders receive private signals about the value of the commodity and rely on those signals to choose positions. Each trader is aware that the other received a private signal, but she believes her own signal to be correct; in essence, traders agree to disagree. In contrast, traders in an RE model believe that prices fully aggregate information and therefore that the other trader's private signal carries some information about the value of the commodity. We show that the DO equilibrium implies that positions held by trader groups are correlated with prices. Specifically, positions are positively correlated with prices for the trader group that receives the strongest signal and negatively correlated for the other group. In a RE equilibrium, traders condition on the price, and correlation between positions and prices is zero. This implication provides an empirical basis for testing the two models.
We use disaggregated Commitments of Traders (DCOT) data published by the CFTC to test the DO theory for corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, lean hogs, and live cattle. The DCOT reports weekly aggregate futures positions held by five trader groups: merchants or producers, swap dealers, managed money, other large traders, and non-reporting small traders. To varying degrees, all groups except for the producer category have been associated with the term "speculators".
Our empirical results provide strong support for the DO-type environment in futures markets, particularly for managed money and producer trader groups. Our results show that the positions of managed money traders are positively correlated with price changes, whereas the positions of producers are negative correlated. This result provides support for the DO model and indicates that managed money traders (i.e., hedge funds) have strong price signals that they use to formulate trade decisions, and that these signals do affect prices. In essence, prices change by more on average than producers think they should and by less than managed money thinks they should. Our results do not reveal which group is correct on average or in any particular episode.
Given the finding in Fishe and Smith (2012) that essentially no trader in either group has significant predictive ability, it is likely that neither group is systematically more prescient than the other. These findings are robust to volatility and seasonal effects and suggest a theoretical explanation for why managed money traders may bring unwanted attention from regulators.
We also find evidence that the position changes of the DCOT trader groups are not synchronized, which supports the view that these participant groups hold different opinions when changing positions. Thus, there is indirect support for the DO model from the relative behavior of position changes.
Our modeling results also provide a framework for the interpretation of the Commitment of Traders data, whereas the previous literature has been less directed at testing a specific theoretical model. Results from extant research have suggested that position changes by trader groups do not Granger-cause futures returns , but there appears to be a relationship between diminished price volatility and increased activity by managed money traders (Brunetti, Büyükşahin, and Harris 2011) and also those same traders may be connected to the rise in correlations across asset groups (Büyükşahin and Robe 2011) .
Conceptual Framework
We start with the premise that all traders contend with a tradeoff between risk and reward. This tradeoff looks different for a firm with a large position in the underlying commodity because a large component of its portfolio return comes from the covariance between its spot and futures positions. We define such firms as hedgers. Firms without a position in the underlying commodity are speculators. In our environment there are two time periods and two traders, each of whom take a position in period 1 and realize profits in period 2. Each trader maximizes expected utility by choosing how many positions to take in the futures contract. In addition to futures, the hedging trader holds Z units of the underlying commodity.
We specify a constant absolute risk aversion utility function. The hedger maximizes
and the speculator maximizes
where γ denotes the risk aversion parameter, 2 2 1 ∆ ≡ − F F F denotes the change in the futures price, Q i denotes the futures position of trader i, and P 2 denotes the period 2 spot price of the commodity. We add subscripts to the expectations operator to allow for differences of opinion across traders based on their information sets.
Traders enter period 1 with homogeneous expectations about the period 2 futures price, given
Both traders understand that there is a normally distributed fundamental shock in period 1 and another normally distributed fundamental shock in period 2. However, neither trader observes the fundamental until the true value of the commodity is revealed in the spot market in period 2. At the beginning of period 1, each trader i receives a signal µ i , which is a noisy estimate of the period 1 fundamental shock. We derive the period 1 futures price based on how traders interpret these signals.
Following Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kramer (2009) , we consider two environments to describe how traders interpret the period 1 signal. In the RE setting, each trader uses the actions of the other to infer her signal and thereby update her own estimate of the period 2 price. In the DO setting, traders agree to disagree; they believe their own signal is perfect and ignore the signal received by the other trader. Mathematically, both traders know that the period 2 futures price is generated by 2 0 1 2
, and that the shocks are distributed as iid normal, i.e.,
The two environments are:
(a) Rational expectations (RE). The signals are generated according to
. Both traders know this signal generating process. The noise terms v i are independent of the true shocks ε 1 and ε 2 .
(b) Differences of opinion (DO). The signals are generated by the same process as value. We do not need to assume that pure noise traders exist in order to obtain our results.
Moreover, the information received by each trader is the same in the DO environment as the RE environment. The difference between the two settings is how each trader views both her own signal and the other trader's signal, which is how we obtain different equilibrium prices across the two settings.
We also allow for the hedger to face basis risk, but for brevity we specify the basis risk to be uncorrelated with the fundamental shocks. Thus, we specify the period 2 spot price as Because shocks are Gaussian, the utility functions in equations (1) and (2) 
In equilibrium, Q H +Q S =0, which implies that the period 1 futures price is
The futures price is a weighted average of the expected price across traders adjusted for a risk premium. The differences between the equilibrium prices in the RE and DO environments arise from differences in the conditional mean and variance of F 2 , and we show these differences and their implications for futures positions next.
Rational Expectations Equilibrium
In a RE equilibrium, each trader believes that the price efficiently aggregates information (Grossman 1976; Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kramer 2009) . Thus, conditional on the 2×1 vector of signals, µ, the formula for the mean of a conditional normal distribution implies that the expected futures price is
Similarly, the conditional variance is
These moment expressions do not differ across traders because in equilibrium both traders have the same information.
Plugging (6) and (7) into (5) implies that the futures price is (8) .
The change in price from period 0 has two components. The first is a weighted average of the signals and the second is a risk aversion term generated by the hedger. In the first term, the weighting vector on the signals equals 2 1
Recalling that A is a vector of ones, this weighting vector depends on , the variance of the noise in each trader's signal relative to variance of the fundamental shock ε 1 . In other words, is an inverse measure of signal precision. Because all traders know the signal generating process in a RE equilibrium, the realized price assigns more weight to the trader with the least noisy signal.
The second component of the change in price in (8) comes from the motivation of the hedger to take futures positions to offset spot price risk. In fact, this term is the risk premium because
The risk premium increases with spot exposure Z because the hedger has to pay a larger premium to induce the speculator to take a larger position. The risk premium is also larger when the noise in each trader's signal is larger, i.e., when Ω is large relative to 2 σ F .
We obtain the positions taken by each trader by substituting (9) and (7) into (4):
These expressions show that positions do not depend on the signal in a RE equilibrium. Traders agree ex post about the value of the commodity, so positions are determined by the supply and demand for hedging, rather than the differential signals. It follows that, holding Z constant, the futures price F 1 is contemporaneously uncorrelated with positions. Next, we show that this result does not hold in the DO equilibrium.
Difference of Opinion Equilibrium
In a DO equilibrium and conditional on her own signal, each trader views the moments of the period 2 futures price as For the hedger, the expected payoff on holding futures is
and for the speculator it is
Each trader expects to earn (or pay) a risk premium and to make money on the perceived incorrectness of the other trader's signal.
Plugging (13) and (14) into (4), optimal positions for each trader are
Holding constant the spot exposure, the trader with the higher value signal desires to take a larger long (or smaller short) position and the trader with the lower value signal desires to do the opposite. The risk aversion parameters moderate the incentive of each trader to take a large position to profit from the perceived ignorance of the other.
The only random variables in the position and price expressions are the signals. Because both prices and positions are affected by the signals, prices will tend to be correlated with positions.
For hedgers, the covariance between prices and positions is
and for speculators it is the negative of this quantity because = − S H Q Q . Thus, the covariance is positive for the trader with the largest variance in the value signal and negative for the other trader.
The correlation in (16), and the corresponding zero correlation for the RE equilibrium, provide the main contribution of this theory. Our model is quite similar to those in Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kramer (2009), Banerjee and Kremer (2010) , and Banerjee (2011), for example, but those authors specify that the signal variance is constant across traders. As a consequence, they do not generate a testable prediction about the correlation between positions and prices. Because the previous literature addresses equity markets in which researchers do not observe the holdings of particular traders or subgroups of traders, such a prediction was not relevant in their studies.
Empirical Implications
The main implication of our theory is that, in the DO equilibrium, prices are positively correlated with positions for the trader who tends to receive the higher value signal. In contrast, prices are uncorrelated with positions in a RE equilibrium. Because prices and positions are jointly determined in equilibrium, the models do not indicate the direction of causality between positions and prices, only correlation between them. However, finding a statistically significant relationship between positions and prices indicates rejection of the RE equilibrium. We test this implication of our model by regressing observed position changes for different trader types on futures price changes.
Our theoretical model presents a stylized view of the world designed to highlight the main correlation result. The model has only two time periods and two traders. We could relax these assumptions with no effect on our main result. Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kramer (2009) Equations (10) and (15) We also investigate whether hedging pressure effects may confound our DO test by examining the synchronicity of position changes. An essential feature of the DO environment is that traders receive different signals. In contrast, if hedging pressure were to drive position and price changes in a RE world, then we would observe synchronous trading among all non-hedgers as they respond to changes demand from a hedger. Thus, the more that trading by groups acting as speculators (or hedgers) contrasts with the trading of other speculators (or hedgers), the greater is the support for the DO-type equilibrium.
In addition to the signals, the absolute risk aversion and volatility parameters affect equilibrium prices and positions. We specify our conceptual model with homogeneous risk aversion. If risk aversion were to vary across traders, then the trader with smaller γ would be more willing to take large positions. A given signal for this trader would move prices by more than the same signal provided to a more risk-averse trader. 4 Thus, although we define a strong signal in (16) as one with high variance, we could similarly have conceptualized a strong signal as one that is received by a trader with relatively low risk aversion, i.e., one who is likely to trade aggressively on the signal.
Similar to risk aversion, high volatility mitigates the effect of the signals on positions in the DO setting. Thus, we may expect the covariance between positions and prices to be higher when volatility is lower. We test this prediction empirically.
The DO equilibrium does not generate predictions for the correlation between volatility and positions. Given that the average difference in signals equals zero, equation (14) reveals that volatility has no effect on average positions in the DO environment. In the RE equilibrium, an increase in fundamental volatility holding all else constant increases the relative informativeness of the signal and therefore increases absolute positions, as seen in (9).
Data
Since 1924 In this paper, we focus on the DCOT data for six, higher volume agricultural commodities:
corn, cotton, lean hogs, live cattle, soybeans, and wheat. These commodities, particularly corn, soybeans and wheat have thousands of independent traders holding a daily position, which supports the competitive assumption in our model (cf., Table 2 in Fishe and Smith, 2012) . The DCOT data offer the most refined, publicly available partition of participant positions and thus provide a closer connection to the notion of hedgers and speculators. The DCOT report divides participants into five groups: a "Producer" group includes traders who self-report their business line as a producer, merchant, processor, or end user; a "Swap" group consists of swap dealers; a "Managed Money" group consists of hedge funds and other managed money companies; an "Other" group includes any other traders whose position size requires daily position reporting such as floor brokers and traders; and a "Non-reporting" group which consists of smaller traders whose overnight positions are below reporting thresholds.
To generate the reported DCOT statistics, the CFTC first aggregates positions held by each trader across maturities. Then, it calculates the net position for each trader (total long minus total short) and the spread position (number of long positions that are offset by a short position in another maturity). 5 Next, it takes all traders with a positive net position in a group and computes the sum. This number is reported as the total long positions held by the group. Similarly, it takes all traders with a negative net position in a group and computes the sum to obtain total short positions held by the group. Finally, it sums the spread positions across traders. The CFTC does not report spread positions for the producer or non-reporting groups, so they cannot be isolated in the analysis.
We also obtain futures price data from the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB). We use settlement prices of the nearby contract on the day corresponding to the DCOT measurement (almost always a Tuesday). We roll over to the next contract in the second week of the month before delivery. To measure price volatility, we use implied volatility calculated by the CRB from at-the-money options using the Black model and realized price volatility calculated as the daily standard deviation of settlement prices over the past 20 trading days. Counting the long, short, and spread positions separately, we have 13 groups in the CFTC data. To investigate whether the simultaneous trading activity of these various groups supports a DO or RE environment, we test these data for synchronicity using the index developed by Fisher For long and short groups, we define a it in two ways:
Group Characteristics and Synchronicity
(a) Same Direction:
For groups with long positions, a it =1 if the position increases in week t
For groups with short positions, a it =1 if the position decreases in week t
(b) Complementary Direction:
For groups with long positions, a it =1 if the position increases in week t
For groups with short positions, a it =1 if the position increases in week t
By construction a spread position expresses no opinion on price levels. When we include spread positions in our synchronicity calculations, we define a it =1 if the position increases in week t.
Definition (a) above is consistent with the long side, so either an increase in a long position or a decrease in a short position in week t sets a it = 1. If traders across groups are acting on common signals as in a RE model, then they would be expected to change positions in a similar direction; that is, their actions would appear to be synchronized, q t would be close to one or zero, and the FK index would converge toward one. Dias, et al. (2004) show that this hypothesis may be tested using a 2 goodness-of-fit statistic. The appropriate test statistic has the form:
where under the null, ~ ( −1)
2
. We implement this test using different combinations of these DCOT groups to isolate any synchronous patterns. Note that rejecting this null provides additional support for the view that at least some groups are engaged in synchronized trading in futures markets.
The first four rows of Table 2 show the estimated value of the synchronicity index for all 13 groups combined, the five long side, five short side, and three spread groups in the DCOT data.
The results show no synchronicity in the all-groups case. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of uniformly staggered position changes implies that no set of trader groups tend to move together when all groups are compared. At this global level, groups do not appear to act on common signals. This result provides evidence against the notion that trading activity is driven by the hedging demands of one group, which are met synchronously by a set of other groups. Similarly, the only-long and only-short groups display no significant synchronicity. Thus, the various long side traders tend not to move together, nor do the short side traders, suggesting that these subgroups do not act on a common signal. However, the spread groups do appear to be synchronized, which implies that relative price or calendar-type information may be held in common by and drive position changes among spread participants.
To further investigate trading behavior, we calculate synchronicity statistics where a it indicates complementary changes in open interest across groups. We define the change in the short position to complement the long side decision using definition (b) above. We report the FK indices for two combinations of trader groups in the last two rows of Table 2 : (i) all long and short groups combined and (ii) the short side of the producer group combined with the long side of the swap and managed money groups to determine if the actions of these groups complement each other.
We find that the long-only and the short-only groups complement each other because increases in the long side are accompanied by increases in the short side, which of course must be true at some aggregation level for futures data. However, the estimated value of the index (average 0.38 over commodities) suggests that only 3-4 of these ten groups are acting synchronized, while the remaining groups may be thought to act on separate information signals.
The final row of table 2 shows that the producer short side group-firms thought of as classic hedgers holding underlying positions-is synchronized with either the swap dealer long side group or the managed money long side group. Thus, producers tend to respond to the signals in a particular week in the opposite direction to swaps dealers or managed money; when producers increase their short position, the other groups tend to increase their long position. This finding suggests that these two groups exhibit differences of opinion.
Our conceptual model predicts a nonzero correlation between changes in positions and changes in prices in a DO environment and a zero correlation in an RE environment. We test this prediction using a regression model. For each trader group i and commodity market j, we estimate the following regression model (19) where F jt denotes the futures price. We define the position changes as the change in net positions (i.e., long minus short) for a particular trader type from week t-1 to t. To compare coefficient estimates across commodities and trader types, we standardize position changes by total market open interest, i.e., (20) .
We estimate 30 regressions, one for each trader-type/commodity combination, using equationby-equation ordinary least squares 8 . We estimate standard errors using the Newey-West estimator with 3 lags.
9 Table 3 shows our results. We find that position changes for the managed money group move strongly with prices and those for the producer group move strongly against prices. Estimates of the price change coefficient β are significantly different from zero at the 1% level across all commodities in the producer and managed money regressions. There is no apparent difference in effects between the livestock and storable commodities. Swap dealers have small positive coefficients for all commodities, but they are only significant for wheat and soybeans. Nonreporting traders, which are small in size, typically have significant positive coefficients (except for live cattle), but these coefficients are much smaller than those for managed money. For the two groups most correlated with prices (producers and managed money), the R 2 is between 0.25 and 0.40 for corn, soybeans and wheat, and a little lower for the other commodities. The R 2 is close to zero for the other cases. These results imply that we reject the hypothesis of a RE equilibrium. As with rejection of any null hypothesis, this finding does not confirm that the DO model is correct, but it does imply that the data are consistent with the DO environment.
Interpreting our results in the context of a DO equilibrium, it appears that managed money firms receive large signals and trade on them, and thereby affect prices. As managed money is commonly a hedge fund, this group is generally regarded as speculators. The finding that their positions are positively correlated with price changes makes it understandable that they may be a target for regulators who show concerns about increasing commodity prices. However, it does not necessarily imply that trading by this group is "excessive" as their private signals must enter the market somehow. Traders in the producer group tend to take positions on the other side of the market, indicating that they receive smaller signals and thus believe the price change should be smaller. These results do not indicate which trader group is more correct. In fact, Fishe and Smith (2012) find that essentially no traders in these groups possess significant predictive ability, so it is likely that the groups are equally likely to be correct.
Note that we define a large signal somewhat tautologically as one that generates a large change in positions. This could arise from a large change in the expected future price, from a smaller change about which a trader is very confident, or from greater access to captial.
Moreover, less risk-averse traders will tend to respond more to a given signal than more riskaverse traders. Thus, our results suggest that managed money traders receive different signals than producers, and they respond more aggressively to these signals. We cannot discern whether this strong response comes from the large average size of the signals, the high precision of the signals, low risk aversion, or greater access to capital. This indeterminacy arises because we observe actions but not beliefs.
Position changes by the swap dealer, other-reporting, and non-reporting trader groups are weakly related to prices. This finding can be interpreted as implying that these groups receive signals that are stronger than producers but weaker than managed money. For example, small individual traders, which would be in the non-reporting group, are restricted to take only small positions. This restriction could be conceptualized as high risk aversion or as restricted access to capital, but it implies that their signals do not move prices. A zero β could also mean that a trader group does not trade on its beliefs about future prices but on changes in its underlying exposure, as long as the group's position changes are either small or predictable enough that they don't affect prices. For example, swaps dealers tend to change positions in a mechanical fashion as the demand for index positions changes, and so they have little price impact (see e.g., Sanders, Irwin and Merrin 2010).
Using COT data, Sanders, Irwin and Merrin (2009) estimate similar regressions to (19), except from a Granger causality perspective. They regress position changes on lagged log price changes and lagged position changes and find evidence that price changes lead position changes.
Our results do not change if we add the lagged log price change and a lagged dependent variable to each equation. 10 The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is about 0.3 for managed money traders, producers and swap traders. It is typically close to zero for the other two groups.
The lagged price coefficient is typically the same sign as on the contemporaneous price, but much smaller. The coefficient on contemporaneous price does not change here because the lagged dependent variable (lagged position changes) and the lagged price are essentially uncorrelated with the current price change.
Volatility
Our theory implies that the connection between positions and prices is stronger when volatility is lower (see equation (16)). Thus, we run the regression
is an indicator function for below average volatility. We use implied volatility to measure price fluctuations, although realized daily volatility in the past month produces very similar results. Table 4 shows that, for five of the six commodities, the estimated γ coefficient in equation (21) is negative for managed money traders, positive for producers, and typically small for everyone else. The value of the coefficient varies across commodities, likely because the magnitude of volatility varies across commodities. Overall, consistent with the DO theory, low volatility exacerbates the price effect for the groups in which we find significant price results.
Spot Exposure
The results in Tables 3 and 4 September. If hedging pressure is important, we expect δ to be positive for producers and correspondingly negative for managed money traders. Table 5 shows our regression estimates of (22), which do not support the hedging pressure view. We find that, when significant, the delta coefficient is positive for managed money traders and generally negative for the producer group. Thus, while spot market exposure is likely important to initial position decisions, it does not seem to significantly affect position changes during the growing season for the crop commodities in our sample.
Overall, these results are consistent with the synchronicity statistics in Table 2 in showing that the predictions of the differences of opinion model are supported by our results and that managed money positions change in the opposite direction to producers' positions, but in the same direction as prices.
Conclusions
We provide a theoretical framework to show that the correlation between changes in log futures prices and positions held by traders in agricultural futures markets are inconsistent with a rational expectations equilibrium and consistent with a differences-of-opinion equilibrium in which traders believe their own signal about the price more than they believe the signals of others. Our findings indicate that prices may deviate from fundamentals, but do not indicate by how much or in which direction.
If managed money traders receive correct signals about prices, then the fact that producers and others appear to disagree with these signals slows down price adjustment. In such cases, futures prices may differ from fundamentals because they under-react to shocks. In contrast, if managed money traders receive incorrect price signals, then they could drive prices away from fundamentals; the calculations in Smith (2013) suggest that the magnitude of such pricing errors is unlikely to be large. Alternatively, managed money and producers groups may offset each other to a limited extent in their price effects, such that managed money may move prices in one direction and producers may subsequently move it in the other, or vice versa. Fishe and Smith (2012) show that neither group has the ability to systematically predict prices, which implies that neither group consistently receives a better signal than the other. In future research, we will investigate the magnitude of the mispricing error implied by these results. (2000) approach to synchronicity to examine whether groups defined in the DCOT report tend to act together; that is, respond to a common signal. The greater the fraction of the synchronicity index, then the greater the fraction of groups changing positions in the same direction, defined to be consistent with the long side (more long/less short) or a complementary direction (absolutely larger in either the long or short direction). This table shows the estimated value of the synchronicity index for same direction changes for all groups combined, the long-side groups, the short-side groups, and the spread groups. Two sets of additional estimates are reported for the complimentary direction case: all long and short groups combined and the long side of the producer group combined with the short side of the swap and managed money groups. An "*" ("**") indicates that the index is significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level. 
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